Languages based on the theory of timed automata are a well established approach for modelling and analysing real-time systems, with many applications both in industrial and academic context. Model checking for timed automata has been studied extensively during the last two decades; however, even now industrial-grade model checkers are available only for few timed automata dialects (in particular Uppaal timed automata), exhibit limited scalability for systems with large discrete state space, or cannot handle parametrised systems. We explore the use of Horn constraints and off-the-shelf model checkers for analysis of networks of timed automata. The resulting analysis method is fully symbolic and applicable to systems with large or infinite discrete state space, and can be extended to include various language features, for instance Uppaal-style communication/broadcast channels and BIPstyle interactions, and systems with infinite parallelism. Experiments demonstrate the feasibility of the method.
Introduction
We consider the analysis of systems with real-time aspects, a problem that is commonly addressed with the help of timed automata models. By modelling systems as timed automata, a variety of relevant properties can be analysed, including schedulability, worst-case execution time of concurrent systems, interference, as well as functional properties. Tools and model checking techniques for timed automata have been studied extensively during the last two decades, one prime example being the Uppaal tool [20] , which uses difference-bound matrices (DBMs) for the efficient representation of time, and explicit representation of data (discrete state). Despite many advances, scalability of tools for analysing timed automata remains a concern, in particular for models of industrial size.
We investigate the use of fully-symbolic model checking for the analysis of timed systems, leveraging counterexample-guided abstraction refinement (CEGAR) [11, 15] to represent state space, with Craig interpolation [7] for the refinement step, as well as the recently proposed framework of Horn clauses [21, 13] as intermediate system representation. Symbolic methods enable us to handle timed systems that are beyond the capabilities of DBM-based model checkers, due to the size of the discrete state space (which in realistic models can be large, or even infinite). The flexibility of Horn constraints makes it possible to elegantly encode language features of timed systems that are commonly considered difficult; in particular, systems with an unbounded (or infinite) number of processes can be handled in much the same way as bounded systems. At the same time, Horn constraints enable the application of various general-purpose model checkers, for instance Z3 [16] , Q'ARMC [12] , or Eldarica [17] , and streamline the engineering of analysis tools.
Contributions of the paper are: (i) a uniform Horn clause encoding for systems with (finite or infinite) concurrency, real-time constraints, as well as inter-process communication using shared memory, synchronous message passing, and synchronisation using barriers; the encoding can be applied, among others, to Uppaal timed automata [20] and BIP [4] ; (ii) an experimental evaluation using a set of (wellknown) parametric timed automata models.
Related Work
We focus on work most closely related to ours; for a general overview of timed automata analysis, the reader is referred to surveys like [25] .
Our work is inspired by recent results on the use of Horn clauses for concurrent system analysis, in particular Owicki-Gries and Rely-Guarantee approaches in [12] . We use Owicki-Gries-style invariants in our work, but generalise the way how invariants can relate different processes of a system (using invariant schemata), and include systems with infinitely many processes and time. For parametric systems, we generate invariants quantifying over all processes in a system; the way such invariants are derived has similarities to [5] , where quantified invariants are inferred in the context of datatypes like arrays. Encoding of timed automata as Horn clauses has also been proposed in [16, 8] , but only restricted to derivation of monolithic system invariants (non-compositional reasoning). Similarly, there is work on non-compositional/parametric analysis of timed systems using logic programming (CLP) [14, 18, 3, 9] .
k-Indexed invariants were introduced in [24] , as an instance of the general concept of threadmodular model checking [10] , using self-reflection to automatically build environments of threads. We carry over the approach to Horn clauses, and investigate its use for extensions of timed systems.
SMT-based full model checking (k-induction and IC3) for timed automata has recently been investigated in [19] , using the region abstraction for discretisation. In comparison, our work relies on CEGAR to handle time and data alike, and achieves compositional and parametric analysis via Horn clauses.
The approach of backward reachability has been used for verification of various classes of parametric systems, including timed systems [2, 1, 6] , establishing decision procedures with the help of suitable syntactic restrictions. A detailed comparison between backward reachability for timed systems and our approach is beyond the scope of this paper, and is planned as future work. Since our approach naturally includes abstraction through CEGAR, we expect better scalability for systems with complex processlocal behaviour (e.g., if individual processes are implemented as software programs). On the other hand, backward reachability gives rise to decision procedures for important classes of parametric systems; it is unclear whether such results can be carried over to our setting.
Motivating Examples

Railway Control System
Fig. 1 depicts a train controller system taken from [26] , consisting of a number of trains travelling towards a critical point that can be passed by only one train at a time, and a controller responsible for preventing collisions. Compared to [26] , the model was simplified by removing the queue to store incoming requests from the trains; since we only focus on safety, not fairness, this queue becomes irrelevant. The controller randomly releases trains without considering any specific order.
The trains communicate with the controller using binary communication channels. When a train approaches the critical point it informs the controller via the channel appr. It then waits for 20 time units; if the controller does not stop the train using stop, it enters its crossing state q 2 . As a safety property of the system we require that at any time only one train can be in q 2 ; using Uppaal, the authors of [26] could successfully prove safety for up to 6 trains. In our setting, we consider the model with infinitely many instances of the train automaton; this subsumes the parametric problem of showing safety for an arbitrary (finite) number N of trains. We show safety of the infinite model (automatically) by computing a quantified inductive invariant of the form ∀id 1 , id 2 , id 3 . I(ctrl, train(id 1 ), train(id 2 ), train(id 3 )), where ctrl is the state of the controller, and train(id) the state of a specific train id; in other words, the invariant [4] expresses a property that holds for any triplet of trains at any time. Note that invariants of this kind can express that at most two trains are in q 3 . Figure 2 shows a temperature control system modeled in the component coordination language BIP [4] . The Controller component is responsible for keeping the value of θ between the values 450 and 900. Whenever the value of θ reaches the upper bound of 900 the Controller sends a cooling command to the Rod 1 and Rod 2 components using its cool port. In the lower bound of 450 the Controller resets the Rods. The Rod components can accept a cool command again only if 3600 time units have elapsed. Compared to [4] , we use the RT-BIP dialect and model both physical time t 1 ,t 2 and temperature θ using clocks. Note that in this model all the communications are in the form of Rendezvous so the priority layer of the BIP glue is essentially empty. The required safety property of the system is to ensure deadlock freedom. Deadlock happens when the value of θ reaches 900 but there was not sufficient time (3600 time units) for the rods to be engaged again.
RT-BIP Example
BIP semantics requires that all processes run to an interaction point, before interaction takes place.
We model this using a basic form of synchronization barrier (Section 7.3), together with a global variable iact to choose between interactions. Among a set of parallel processes that share a barrier, whenever a process reaches the barrier it stops until all the other processes reach the barrier. Verification shows that the model has a deadlock; the heating period of the controller is faster than the required delay time of the rods.
Preliminaries
Constraint languages. Throughout this paper, we assume that a first-order vocabulary of interpreted symbols has been fixed, consisting of a set Σ f of fixed-arity function symbols, and a set Σ p of fixed-arity predicate symbols. Interpretation of Σ f and Σ p is determined by a fixed structure (U, I), consisting of a non-empty universe U, and a mapping I that assigns to each function in Σ f a set-theoretic function over U, and to each predicate in Σ p a set-theoretic relation over U. As a convention, we assume the presence of an equation symbol "=" in Σ p , with the usual interpretation. Given a set X of variables, a constraint language is a set Constr of first-order formulae over Σ f , Σ p , X. For example, the language of quantifierfree Presburger arithmetic (mainly used in this paper) has Σ f = {+, −, 0, 1, 2, . . .} and Σ p = {=, ≤, |}, with the usual semantics. We write dist(
Horn Clauses. We consider a set R of uninterpreted fixed-arity relation symbols. A Horn clause is a formula
• each B i is an application p(t 1 , . . . ,t k ) of a relation symbol p ∈ R to first-order terms over Σ f , X;
• H is similarly either an application p(t 1 , . . . ,t k ) of p ∈ R to first-order terms, or false.
H is called the head of the clause, C ∧ B 1 ∧ · · · ∧ B n the body. In case C = true, we usually leave out C and just write H ← B 1 ∧ · · · ∧ B n . First-order variables in a clause are implicitly universally quantified; relation symbols represent set-theoretic relations over the universe U of a structure (U, I) ∈ S. Notions like (un)satisfiability and entailment generalise to formulae with relation symbols. Definition 1 (Solvability). Let HC be a set of Horn clauses over relation symbols R. HC is called (semantically) solvable (in the structure (U, I)) if there is an interpretation of the relation symbols R as set-theoretic relations such that the universal closure Cl ∀ (h) of every clause h ∈ HC holds in (U, I); in other words, if the structure (U, I) can be extended to a model of the clauses HC.
We can practically check solvability of sets of Horn clauses by means of predicate abstraction [12, 23] , using tools like Z3 [16] , Q'ARMC [12] , or Eldarica [17] .
Basic Encoding of Concurrent Systems
Semantics of Concurrent Systems
We work in the context of a simple, but expressive system model with finitely or infinitely many processes executing concurrently in interleaving fashion; in subsequent sections, further features like communication will be added. Each process has its own local state (taken from a possibly infinite state space), and in addition the system as a whole also has a (possibly infinite) global state that can be accessed by all processes. We use the following notation:
• G is a non-empty set representing the global state space.
• P is a non-empty index set representing processes in the system.
• The non-empty set L p represents the local state space of a process p ∈ P.
• Init p ⊆ G × L p is the set of initial states of a process p ∈ P.
is the transition relation of a process p ∈ P, with global states g, g ∈ G and local states l, l ∈ L p .
Given a set of processes defined in this manner, we can derive a system by means of parallel composition:
for the local state belonging to process p ∈ P.
is the set of initial system states.
• The transition relation of the system as a whole is defined by:
We writel[p/l ] ∈ ∏ p∈P L p for the state vector obtained by updating the component belonging to
Safety. We are interested in checking safety properties of systems as defined above. We define (un)safety in the style of coverability, by specifying a vector ( p 1 , E 1 , . . . , p m , E m ) of process-state-pairs, where the p i ∈ P are pairwise distinct, and E i ⊆ G × L p i for each i ∈ {1, . . . , m}. System error states are:
Intuitively, a system state is erroneous if it contains m (pairwise distinct) processes whose state is in E 1 , . . . , E m , respectively. Error properties like occurrence of local runtime exceptions or violation of mutual exclusion can be expressed using this concept of error; for instance, the property that the processes p 1 , p 2 cannot reside in some state (g, l) together is captured by ( p 1 , {(g, l)} , p 2 , {(g, l)} ). A system is safe if there is no sequence s 0 → s 1 → . . . → s n of transitions such that s 0 ∈ S 0 and s n ∈ Err.
Encoding Safety of Finite Systems
To check that a system is safe it is sufficient to find an inductive invariant, which is a set Inv ⊆ S of states with the properties (i) Initiation: S 0 ⊆ Inv; (ii) Consecution: for all s → t with s ∈ Inv, also t ∈ Inv; and (iii) Safety: Inv ∩ Err = / 0. The following sections define methods to derive inductive invariants with the help of Horn constraints. We first concentrate on the case of a finite set P = {1, 2, . . . , n} of processes, and show how an encoding in the spirit of Owicki-Gries [22] can be done with the help of Horn constraints. In comparison to earlier work [12] , inductive invariants can be defined to cover individual processes, as well as sets of processes, in order to handle required relational information (inspired by the concept of k-indexed invariants [24] ). We define this concept formally with the help of invariant schemata.
Recall that the component-wise order < on the set N n is a well-founded partial order. An antichain is a set A ⊆ N n whose elements are pairwise <-incomparable; as a consequence of Dickson's lemma, antichains over N n are finite. An invariant schema for the processes P = {1, 2, . . . , n} is an antichain To define the system invariant specified by a schema A, we assume that {Rā |ā ∈ A} is a set of relation variables, later to be used as vocabulary for Horn constraints. Further, given a local state vectorl ∈ ∏ p∈R L p andā ∈ A, we writel[ā] for the vector
, where i 1 < i 2 < · · · < i k are the indexes of non-zero entries inā = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) (i.e., {i 1 , . . . , i k } = {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} | a i > 0}). The system invariant is then defined as the conjunction of the individual relation symbols Rā, applied to global and selected local states:
Concrete solutions for the variables {Rā |ā ∈ A}, subject to the conditions Initiation, Consecution, and Safety given in the beginning of this section, can be computed by means of an encoding as Horn clauses. For this purpose, we assume that a system can be represented within some constraint language, for instance within Presburger arithmetic: the sets Init p , the transition relation s p → t, as well as the error specification ( p 1 , E 1 , . . . , p m , E m ) are encoded as constraints in this language. Horn clauses can then be formulated as shown in Fig. 3 . Clause (2) represents initiation, for each of the variables Rā; (3) is consecution, and expresses that every relation Rā is preserved by transitions of any process p, and (4) encodes unreachability of error states.
In (3), (4), we refer to a context invariant Ctxt({p 1 , . . . , p k }, g,l), which includes those literals from Inv(g,l) relevant for the processes p 1 , . . . , p k :
However, note that different choices can be made concerning invariants Rā to be mentioned in the body of (3), (4); it is in principle possible to add arbitrary literals from Inv(g,l). Adding more literals results in constraints that are weaker, and potentially easier to satisfy, but can also introduce irrelevant information. Fig. 3 are solvable for some invariant schema A, then the analysed system is safe.
Lemma 1 (Soundness). If the constraints in
Lemma 2 (Completeness).
If a system is safe, then there exists an invariant schema A such that the constraints in Fig. 3 are (semantically) solvable.
It is important to note that Lem. 2 talks about semantic solvability. Despite existence of such a modeltheoretic solution, in general there is no guarantee that a symbolic solution exists that can be expressed as a formula of the chosen constraint language. However, such guarantees can be derived for individual classes of systems, for instance for the case that the considered system is a network of timed automata (and a suitable constraint language like linear arithmetic).
Counterexample-Guided Refinement of Invariant Schemata
The question remains how it is practically possible to find invariant schemata that are sufficient to find inductive invariants. This aspect can be addressed via a counterexample-guided refinement algorithm. Initially, verification is attempted using the weakest invariant schema, A 0 = { (1, 0, 0, . . .), (0, 1, 0, . . .) , . . .}. If verification is impossible, a Horn solver will produce a concrete counterexample to solvability of the generated Horn constraints. It can then be checked whether this counterexample points to genuine unsafety of the system, or just witnesses insufficiency of the invariant schema. In the latter case, a stronger invariant schema can be chosen, and verification is reattempted.
Safety for Unbounded Systems
Encoding of Unbounded Homogeneous Systems
We now relax the restriction that the process index set P of a system is finite, and also consider an infinite number of processes. Since our definition of safety only considers finite paths into potential error states, this represents the case of systems with an unbounded number of (active) threads. Showing safety for a system with infinitely many processes raises the challenge of reasoning about a state vector with infinitely many entries. This can be addressed by exploiting the symmetry of the system, by deriving a single parametric invariant that is inductive for each process; the corresponding system invariant universally quantifies over all processes. Necessary relational information pertaining to multiple processes can be captured with the help of k-indexed invariants [24] . The correctness of parametric invariants can be encoded as a finite set of Horn constraints, which again yields an effective method to derive such invariants automatically.
Initially we restrict attention to homogeneous systems, in which all processes share the same initial states and transition relation; however, each process has access to its process id (as a natural number), and can adapt its behaviour with respect to the id. 1 We assume that P = N, Init p = Init, and L p = L for all processes p ∈ P. Then, for any number k ∈ N >0 , and given a fresh relation variable R, a k-indexed invariant has the shape:
R represents a formula that can talk about the global state g, as well as about k pairs (p i ,l[p i ]) of (pairwise distinct) process identifiers and local process states. R can therefore express which combinations of states of multiple processes can occur simultaneously, and encode properties like mutual exclusion (at most one process can be in some state at a time). For k = 1, the invariants reduce to Owicki-Gries-style invariants (for infinitely many processes). Figure 4 : Horn constraints encoding a homogeneous infinite system with the help of a k-indexed invariant. S k is the symmetric group on {1, . . . , k}, i.e., the group of all permutations of k numbers; as an optimisation, any generating subset of S k , for instance transpositions, can be used instead of S k . In (10), we define r = max{m, k}. Fig. 4 gives the Horn clauses encoding the assumed properties of Inv(g,l) for a given k. Since kindexed invariants quantify over all permutations of k processes, it can be assumed that R is symmetric, which is captured by (6) . Initiation is encoded in (7). Consecution is split into two cases: (8) covers the situation that p ∈ {p 1 , . . . , p k } makes a transition, and (9) for transitions due to some process p 0 ∈ {p 1 , . . . , p k }. In (8), due to symmetry of R, it can be assumed that p = p 1 . Unreachability of errors ( p 1 , E 1 , . . . , p m , E m ) is specified by (10) .
As shorthand notation in (9), (10), for numbers a, b ∈ N with a ≤ b the expression RConj(a, . . . , b)
represents the conjunction of all R-instances for process ids in the range a, . . . , b (as in Sect. 4.2, it is possible to include further literals from Inv(g,l) in the body of (8)-(10), resulting in weaker constraints): Fig. 4 are satisfiable for a given k, then they are also satisfiable for any k > k (for the same system).
Theorem 1 (Expressiveness). (i) If the constraints in
(ii) If k > k > 0, then there are systems that can be verified with k -indexed invariants, but not with k-indexed invariants.
Encoding of Unbounded Heterogeneous Systems
The encodings of Sect. 4.2 and 5.1 can be combined, to analyse systems that contain n different types of processes, each of which can either be a singleton process, or a process that is infinitely replicated. Compared to Sect. 5.1, process types enable more fine-grained use of k-indexed invariants, since it is now possible to specify which processes are considered with which arity in an invariant.
More formally, we now use the process index set P = i=1,...n ({i} × P i ), where P i is either {0} (singleton case) or N (replicated case). Invariant schemata from Sect. 4.2 generalise to unbounded heterogeneous systems, and are now antichains A of the partially ordered set
This means that an invariant can refer to at most one instance of a singleton process, but to multiple instances of replicated processes. As in Sect. 4.2, we use a set {Rā |ā ∈ A} of relation variables, and define the system invariant as a conjunction of individual invariants, each of which now quantifies over ids of processes. Namely, for a vectorā = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) and process type i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a i distinct pro-
Inv(g,l) = ā∈Ā a=(a 1 ,...,a n )
. . , p n a n ,l[(n, p n a n )])
It is then possible to formulate Horn constraints about the required properties of the invariants. The Horn clauses combine features of those in Fig. 3 and 4 , but are left out from this paper due to the notational complexity.
Example 2. Consider the railway control system in Fig. 1 , which consists of a singleton process P 1 = {0}, the controller, and an infinitely replicated process P 2 = N, the trains. The system can be verified with the schema A = {(1, 3)}; this means, an inductive invariant is derived that relates the controller with a triplet of (arbitrary, but distinct) trains.
Encoding of Physical Time
We now describe how our model of execution, and the encoding as Horn constraints, can be extended to take physical time into account. In this and the following sections we focus on the Horn encoding of unbounded homogeneous systems (Sect. 5.1), but stress that the same extensions are possible for heterogeneous systems (Sect. 5.2) and finite systems (Sect. 4.2). In our system model, time is represented as a component of the global state g ∈ G. As a convention, we write g[C] to access the current time, and g = g[C/C ] to update time to a new value C ∈ Time, where Time = Q for a dense model of time, and Time = Z for discrete time. Time elapse is represented by an additional rule, augmenting the transition relation as defined in Sect. 4.1:
The premises state that time can only develop monotonically, and only as long as the time invariant TInv p ⊆ G × L p of all processes p ∈ P is satisfied. We make the assumption that TInv p is convex with respect to time, i.e.,
Concepts like clocks or stopwatches can easily be represented by defining local process transitions. For instance, a clock is realised by means of a Time-valued variable x; resetting the clock is translated to the assignment x := g[C], so that the value of the clock at any point is g[C] − x.
When the model of time is dense it is still possible to retain the global variable C in the integer domain. Considering the value of time to be a fractional number, the variable C can store the numerator, and a new global variable U is added to the system to represent the denominator. The variable U is initialised with an arbitrary positive value at system start, but can then stay constant throughout the system execution, whereas the numerator C is incremented by time elapse transitions. The encoding of rationals using numerator and denominator faithfully represents dense time, but makes it possible to keep all variables integer-valued. In practice this is helpful when no rational solver is available. For the purpose of analysis within our framework, we reduce BIP rendezvous to barrier synchronisation as in Sect. 7.2. We make two simplifying assumptions: (i) in no state (g, l) of a process p ∈ P both local transitions ((g, l) p → · · · ) and interacting transitions ((g, l) p, a −→ · · ·) are enabled; this will ensure the third premise of bip-comm; and (ii) no two processes p 1 , p 2 ∈ P share the same port a ∈ Port. Both assumptions can be established through suitable transformations of a system.
We then encode BIP interaction using a single barrier {b} = Ba. To distinguish interactions, we choose a bijection h : I → {1, . . . , |I|} that provides a unique integer as label for each interaction, and add a global variable iact (part of the global state g ∈ G) ranging over {1, . . . , |I|}. In addition, we denote the ports used by a process p ∈ P by Port p ⊆ Port. Each process p ∈ P of the system is modified as follows:
• each interacting transition (g, l)
p, a −→ (g , l ) is replaced with two barrier transitions. The first barrier transition is (g, l)
p, b −→ (g , l ), and guarded with the test a ∈ h −1 (iact). The second transition is (g, l)
p, b −→ (g, l), i.e., does not cause state changes, and is guarded with Port p ∩ h −1 (iact) = / 0.
• a transition (g, l)
p → (g[iact/ * ], l) non-deterministically assigning a value to the variable iact is added to the process p; this transition is always enabled.
Experimental Evaluation
We have integrated our technique into the predicate abstraction-based model checker Eldarica [17] . In Table 5 we show results for benchmarks 3 encoding timed models, verifying natural safety properties of the models. All models but the temperature control system (Sect. 2.2) are unbounded; finite instances of which are commonly used as benchmarks for model checkers. Most of the benchmarks were originally specified as Uppaal timed automata. For each benchmark we provide a correct version and an unsafe version, to demonstrate the ability of our tool to prove correctness and provide counter-examples for incorrect benchmarks. The Fischer benchmarks contain an observer process, which is the second component of the invariant schema. The results demonstrate the feasibility of our approach. Further, it can be seen that the majority of the benchmarks require stronger invariant schemata, highlighting the benefits of k-indexed invariants. Most benchmarks are solved within a few seconds.
